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Abstract. With the emerging technologies of Internet of Things (IOTs), the 
capabilities of mobile devices have increased tremendously. However, in the 
big data era, to complete tasks on one device is still challenging. As an emerg-
ing technology, crowdsourcing utilizing crowds of devices to facilitate large 
scale sensing tasks has gaining more and more research attention. Most of exist-
ing works either assume devices are willing to cooperate utilizing centralized 
mechanisms or design incentive algorithms using double auctions. Which is not 
practical to deal with the case when there is a lack of centralized controller for 
the former, and not suitable to the case when the seller device is also resource 
constrained for the later. In this paper, we propose a truthful incentive mecha-
nism with combinatorial double auction for crowd sensing task assignment in 
device-to-device (D2D) clouds, where a single mobile device with intensive 
sensing task can hire a group of idle neighboring devices. With this new mech-
anism, time critical sensing tasks can be handled in time with a distributed na-
ture. We prove that the proposed mechanism is truthful, individual rational, 
budget balance and computational efficient. Our simulation results demonstrate 
that combinatorial double auction mechanism gets a 26.3% and 15.8% gains in 
comparison to existing double auction scheme and the centralized maximum 
matching based algorithm respectively. 
Keywords: Mobile Crowd Sensing, Device-to-Device Clouds, Combinatorial 
Double Auction, Task Allocation. 
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1 Introduction 
Throughout the last a few years, mobile devices like smart phones, laptops and ipads 
have become proliferation in people’s daily life. They can generate massive infor-
mation about the environment by themselves for sensing the physical world. Mobile 
crowd sensing [18], which defined as individuals with sensing and computing devices 
collectively share data and extract information to measure and map phenomena of 
common interest, is more and more popular in the evolution of the Internet of Things 
(IoT). 
 In general, mobile crowd sensing classifies as personal sensing and community 
sensing. Personal sensing always senses one simple task, like the monitoring of 
movement patterns of an individual for personal record-keeping or health care rea-
sons. Community sensing defines as a cognitive sensing mode that requires many 
individual devices participated together which is suitable for large-scale phenomenon, 
such as intelligent transportation systems. 
Although new devices are becoming more and more powerful, users take for grant-
ed the ability of their resources to perform complicated sensing tasks like air quality 
monitoring [19], traffic information mapping [20] and public information sharing 
[21]. However, the complicated sensing tasks are constrained by the limited computa-
tional, energy and data resources. In order to ensure the normal operation of sensing 
applications, we can consider a set of mobile devices forming what we called Device-
to-Device (D2D) Clouds [1]. Device-to-device cloud are consisted of a set of mobile 
devices and a cluster head or an access point (AP), shown in Figure 1.  
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Fig. 1. One example of device-to-device (D2D) cloud 
Users or mobile devices may generate many large scale sensing tasks which is dif-
ficult to process in a short time efficiently by a single device. By the use of 
crowdsourcing we can offload the task to nearby devices. Therefore, task allocation is 
a key issue in mobile crowd sensing. There have been two incentive methods for task 
allocation, one called centralized algorithm and the other was distributed algorithm. In 
the distributed algorithm, game theory and auction are two common ways used in task 
allocation. Recently, auction is becoming a popular method for solving task allocation 
problem in mobile crowd sensing [10]. In general, there are four types auction——
single auction, double auction, combinatorial auction and combinatorial double auc-
tion. An auction involving both buyers and sellers is called double auction [12], com-
binatorial auction mechanism is first used for airport time slot allocation [13], combi-
natorial double auction is first proposed in [14] for a market with public goods. Exist-
ing studies for crowd sensing such as [22] [23] [24] are based on double auction 
mechanisms. In the double auction mechanisms, one task can only be offloaded to one 
devices, this may cause big delay while processing a large scale tasks. Therefore, it is 
necessary to use a combinatorial double auction (CDA) mechanism for the task allo-
cation by the use of crowdsourcing. 
Designing a CDA mechanism for mobile crowd sensing has two major challenges. 
For all the participants, both the sensing tasks and the devices, the mechanisms is 
essential to bring benefits and be fairly to them. Another major challenge is how to 
allocate the sensing tasks, in the general case, finding the optimal task allocation solu-
tion is a NP-hard problem that cannot be solved in polynomial time. 
In this paper, we mainly consider a Combinatorial dOuble aUction for taSk as-
signmenT in device-to-device Crowdsourcing clouds (COUSTIC) problem. To tackle 
the problem and the two challenges mentioned below, we try to design an efficient 
combinatorial double auction mechanism for task allocation in D2D clouds. The ma-
jor contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: 
 We first analyze the situation where there are several tasks and several mobile 
devices in the D2D clouds, then we formulate the task assignment as a com-
binatorial double auction problem into an integer programming problem. That 
we design a polynomial time greedy algorithm to reduce the computational 
complexity and solve the utility maximization problem.  
 The proposed greedy algorithms are efficient because of their polynomial 
time complexity running time. We prove that the proposed auction algorithms 
are truthful, budget balanced and they are individual rational.  
 We build the D2D clouds model and the combinatorial double auction (CDA) 
model, and compare our model with the double auction, random allocation, 
and the maximum matching allocation mechanism. Simulation results show 
that our model get a good result, it can be treat as a new method for the task 
assignments in D2D clouds. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the related 
works on auction schemes for task allocation. Section 3 describes the system model 
and formulate the problem. Section 4 presents the algorithm for task assignment and 
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pricing payments, then prove the several properties of the auction. Section 5 presents 
the simulation results. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6. 
2 Related work 
In recent years, many works of D2D clouds have been proposed. For example, 
A .Mitbaa et.al.[1][2] develop a computational offloading scheme that maximize the 
lifetime of the ensemble of mobile device. However, in D2D clouds, not all the devic-
es are willing to offload extra tasks without payment. K .Habak et.al.[3] consider how 
a collection of co-located devices can be orchestrated to provide a cloud service at 
edge and present the FemtoClouds system. X .Wang et.al.[4] constructs the task as-
signment in D2D clouds based on double auction mechanisms. Auction is a popular 
trading mechanism that can allocate resources between the buyers and the sellers. In 
auction, prices of the resources are determined by the task’s (buyers) willingness to 
pay and the devices (sellers) would not face the uncertainly of the best resource price 
[5].  
 Double auction model is commonly used in task allocation problems. X.Wang 
et.al.[4] proposed a double auction model in D2D clouds. They consider both situa-
tion of homogeneous and heterogeneous, and design corresponding algorithms to 
solve the task assignment problem and payment scheme. D .Yang et.al.[12] also an-
nounced a truthful double auction scheme for cooperative communications (TASC) in 
D2D clouds, the TASC model is also individual rationality, budget balanced and 
truthfulness. However, the models mentioned above do not consider the situation of 
crowdsourcing for a large scale task. 
 Mobile Crowd sensing is closely connected with auction, several incentive auction 
model were proposed to attract more user participated in providing service [15] [16] 
[17]. Similar to the crowdsourcing service mechanism, Combinational double auction 
mechanism is also an incentive mechanism which offload the task to other devices for 
reducing latency and improving data quality. It is also another feasible way to solve 
problems in different scenes. L .Chen et.al.[6] proposed a novelty CDA mechanism 
for spectrum allocation in cognitive radio network, G .Baranwal et.al.[7] also an-
nounced a fair CDA model for resource allocation in cloud computing. K .Xu pro-
posed that CDA is also adopted for mobile cloud computing markets [8]. 
P .Samimi .et.al[9] also announced a CDA model in cloud computing for resource 
allocation, but the model does not satisfies some economic properties, like individual 
rationality. However, the model proposed in [9] did not achieve individual rationality, 
and the model proposed in [8] is too complicated to be suitable for a simple D2D 
cloud situation.  
3 Problem Definition 
In this section, we first introduce the model of D2D clouds and the model of combina-
torial double auction (CDA). Then we formulate the problem and present the four 
economic properties of the auction. 
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3.1 Device-to-Device Cloud Model 
We consider a situation in a Device-to-Device (D2D) Cloud, combined with an access 
point (AP) and a set of mobile users. In a D2D cloud, we suppose that D =
{𝑑1, 𝑑2, … 𝑑𝑛} are the mobile users willing to participate in task assignments. Each 
user in D may carry the task by itself, or it may be idle, or it can participate in the task 
assignment. 
In general, we believe that m tasks T = {𝑇1, 𝑇2, … 𝑇𝑚} are created during the use of 
mobile devices, and we assume that each task are consisted of multiple subtasks. For 
each sub-task 𝑇𝑖 , i ∈ {1,2, …𝑚}  is denoted by 𝑇𝑖 = {𝜃𝑖,1𝑡1, 𝜃𝑖,2𝑡2, … 𝜃𝑖,𝑘𝑡𝑘} , θ𝑖,𝑗  de-
notes the demand for each type of tasks. And v𝑖 is the true valuation for the compu-
ting process of the sub-task 𝑇𝑖 . The problem we need to solve is the allocation of these 
applications. 
For a group of mobile device in a D2D cloud network, due to the heterogeneity of 
mobile devices, different mobile devices have different computing resources, storage 
capacity, and so on. Therefore, the types and quantities of tasks that can be run on 
each device are also different. We assume as follows: each devices j has its own free 
resources R𝑗 , the total free resources of n devices are represented as: ?⃗? =
{𝑅1, 𝑅2, … 𝑅𝑛}.  
3.2 Combinatorial Double Auction Model 
In this system, there are several sensing tasks (buyers) which need to be processed 
efficiently and devices (sellers) which have a large amount of computing resources, 
and the access point serves as an auctioneer. Each task submits a bid to the access 
point, denoted as 𝐵𝑖 = {𝜃𝑖⃗⃗⃗  , 𝑣𝑖}  where 𝜃𝑖⃗⃗⃗  = {𝜃𝑖,1, 𝜃𝑖,2, … 𝜃𝑖,𝑘}  represents the demand 
amount of every subtask. 𝑣𝑖 denotes the truthful value evaluated by the ith task. 
Consider about all mobile devices (sellers), each device submits a bid S𝑗 to the auc-
tioneer, j ∈ {1,2, … n}. 𝑆𝑗 = {𝑠𝑗⃗⃗ , 𝑤𝑗 , 𝑐𝑗} where 𝑠𝑗⃗⃗ = {𝑠𝑗,1, 𝑠𝑗,2, … 𝑠𝑗,𝑘}. 𝑠𝑗,𝑖  represents the 
ith type resource owned by device j, 𝑠𝑗⃗⃗  denotes a combination of resource provided by 
device j. 𝑤𝑗  represents the maximum number that can provide this type of service. 𝑐𝑗 
denotes the truthful value evaluated by the ith device’s cost. 
While the access point (AP) get all bids from buyers and sellers. It acts as an auc-
tioneer to determine who has failed or wined in the auction, and expresses a task as-
signment scheme at the same time. The scheme includes one task offloaded to which 
devices and each devices offload how many. At the same time, the auctioneer com-
putes the charge and payment by a pricing model. Then get charge from tasks and pay 
corresponding money to the sellers. The flow of the proposed CDA model shows in 
Fig.2. 
3.3 Problem Formulation 
In this work, one application is consisted of multiple tasks capable to be divided and 
to be distributed to multiple mobile devices for parallel computing in the auction 
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model. And the extra cost of distributed computing denoted as 𝑒𝑖 = α ∗ 𝑡𝑖 +  β  where 
α and β are positive constant. 
Let M denote the set of tasks in the D2D cloud and |M|=m. Let N denote the set of 
mobile users in the D2D cloud and |N|=n. Obviously, the access point (AP) formed an 
allocation matrix. The matrix is a M*N matrix and is denoted as 𝑥𝑚𝑛. 
Each element in matrix X can be denoted as 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = {
1,   𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑗 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘
0, o𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (1) 
Since the task is offloaded to each device, the sum of the requested resources can-
not exceed the maximum resources of the device. Thus 
 1
, {1,2,... }
m
kj j
k
m w j n

 
 (2) 
At the same time, each task gets enough resources from several devices. Hence 
 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 ∗ 𝑠𝑘⃗⃗  ⃗ ≥ 𝜃𝑖⃗⃗⃗   , i ∈ {1,2…𝑚} (3) 
Let 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 denotes the final payment for the ith task. And 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 de-
notes the final payment for the jth device. Then we can get the utility for both the 
buyers and the sellers. The utility of ith task (buyer) is: 
 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
𝑏 = {
(𝑣𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖) − 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖  , 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑤𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
0 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 (4) 
The utility of jth device (seller) is: 
 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗
𝑠 = {
 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 − ∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑗
𝑚
𝑘=1  ,   𝑖𝑓 𝑗𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
0 ,   𝑖𝑓 𝑗𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 (5) 
Therefore, given the bids from the tasks and the devices, firstly the access point 
(AP) needs to determine the allocation matrix X, by the allocation matrix, we can also 
get the payment and the charge for the buyers and sellers. The problem to determine 
X can be formulated as follows: 
 max (∑ 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
𝑏𝑚
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗
𝑠𝑛
𝑗=1 ) (6) 
subject to: 
 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑖=1 ≤ 𝑤𝑗  , ∀𝑑𝑗 ∈ 𝐷 (7) 
 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 ∗ 𝑠𝑗⃗⃗ ≥ 𝜃𝑖⃗⃗⃗   , ∀𝑡𝑖 ∈ 𝑇 (8) 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0,1} , i ∈ {1,2…𝑚} 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑗 ∈ {1,2…𝑛} (9) 
Refer to the work in [11], the above problem of determine allocation matrix is an 
NP-hard problem. The optimal solution is unable to be obtained in polynomial time. 
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The problem has both capacity constraint and deadline limitation. Unlike traditional 
double auction model [4][12], the use of multiple combinations increases the com-
plexity and difficulty. 
3.4 Economic Properties 
Our goal is to design a combinatorial double auction mechanism, and the mechanism 
is able to achieve the three economic properties in polynomial time: individual ration-
ality, budget balance and truthfulness. 
Individual Rationality. A combinatorial auction is individually rational if no win-
ner’s utility is negative. 
Budget Balance. The auctioneer’s revenue is not negative. The property is utilized to 
motivate the auctioneer to participate in the auction. 
Truthfulness. The bid submitted by each buyer and seller should be truthful. No one 
can get more utility by submitted a fake bid. 
Computational efficiency. The mechanism or algorithm we propose should be 
solved in polynomial time.  
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Fig. 2. The flow of communications among the combinatorial double auction model in MDCs. 
4 Greedy Allocation Mechanism 
In this section, we present a greedy algorithm to solve the NP-hard problem ([Eq.6] to 
[Eq.9]). Although the optimal solution of an NP-hard problem is impossible to get in 
polynomial time, it is feasible to get an approximate optimal solution. The bid density 
is utilized to push bids for an efficient allocation, and the bid density must be a mono-
tonic function. The bid density should reflect the value of sub-tasks and resources, 
which is a function about v or c. Different from the bid density used in [9], we define 
the bid density of tasks and devices as follows:  
 𝑏𝑑_𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖 = √∑ 𝜃𝑖,𝑗
2𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝑣𝑖
2 , i ∈ {1,2…𝑚} (10) 
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 𝑏𝑑_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 = √∑
1
𝑠𝑖,𝑗
2⁄
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝑐𝑗
2 , 𝑗 ∈ {1,2…𝑛} (11) 
Therefore, we have 
 √𝑣1
2 + ∑ 𝜃1,𝑗
2𝑘
𝑗=1 ≥ √𝑣2
2 + ∑ 𝜃2,𝑗
2𝑘
𝑗=1 ≥ ⋯ ≥ √𝑣𝑚
2 + ∑ 𝜃𝑚,𝑗
2𝑘
𝑗=1  (12) 
 √𝑐1
2 + ∑ 1
𝑠1,𝑗
2⁄
𝑘
𝑗=1 ≥ √𝑐2
2 + ∑ 1
𝑠2,𝑗
2⁄
𝑘
𝑗=1 ≥ ⋯ ≥ √𝑐𝑛
2 + ∑ 1
𝑠𝑛,𝑗
2⁄
𝑘
𝑗=1  (13) 
Then, we design the allocation model and the pricing model are shown in algo-
rithm 1 and algorithm 2, and the complexity of two models are both O(mn). And 
prove the pricing and the allocation model satisfy several economic properties. 
4.1 Allocation Model 
The allocation model is a scheme or an algorithm to determine which task should be 
assigned to which device. In a D2D cloud, bids of tasks and mobile devices are sub-
mitted to the access point (AP). According to the definition of bid density [Eq.12, 13], 
the bids are sorted in ascending order and descending order by the access point (AP). 
The AP determines the allocation matrix by a greedy strategy which describes in Al-
gorithm 1(see Fig.3). 
Algorithm 1   
Input: M,N, B, S  //The number of tasks M, the number of devices N, bids of  the tasks B 
// bids of the devices S 
Output: X //allocation matrix X 
1: Calculate and sort the bids of tasks and devices 
2: E =  {∅}  
3: Normalized v and θ between (0,1) 
4: for i =  1 to M do 
5:     𝑏𝑑_𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖 = √∑ 𝜃𝑖,𝑗
2𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝑣𝑖
2 
6:     E = E ∪ {𝑏𝑑_𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖} 
7: end for 
8: sort bid densities in E in descending order 
9: F =  {∅} 
10: Normalized s and c between (0,1) 
11: for j =  1 to N do 
12:     𝑏𝑑_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 = √∑
1
𝑠𝑖,𝑗
2⁄
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝑐𝑗
2 
13:     F = F ∪ {𝑏𝑑_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗} 
14: end for 
15: sort bid densities in F in ascending order 
16: initialize allocation matrix X 
17: 𝑋𝑚𝑛 = 0 
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18: for e ＝ 1 to |E| do 
19:      for f ＝ 1 to |F| do 
20:           if w > 0 and v >  c and θ > 0: // enough cost and enough resources  
21:              𝑋𝑒𝑓 = 1,𝑤 = 𝑤 − 1, 𝜃 = 𝜃 − 𝑠 
22:          end if 
23:     end for 
24:     if θ < 0: //announce the eth task win the auction           
25:     end if 
26: end for 
27: get allocation matrix X 
Fig. 3. The greedy allocation algorithm 
4.2 Pricing  Model 
We then introduce the pricing model which decides the payment of buyers and the 
charge of sellers. The payment should be enough fairy. Similar to the work of [5] [7], 
while the allocation matrix is fixed, the winning resources of each buyer is also fixed 
as follows: 
 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖 = ∑𝑥𝑖𝑗 ∗ ∑ 𝑠𝑗  , i ∈  {1,2…𝑚} , 𝑗 ∈ {1,2…𝑛} (14) 
We define the per unit price for resources as follows: 
 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖 =
𝑣𝑖
∑𝑥𝑖𝑗∗∑ 𝑠𝑗
 , i ∈  {1,2…𝑚}, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2…𝑛}  (15) 
 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 =
𝑐𝑗
∑𝑠𝑗
 , i ∈  {1,2…𝑚}, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2…𝑛} (16) 
Next, the average price matrix P was calculated based on the average value of [Eq.15] 
and [Eq.16], then we use the algorithm 2(see Fig.4) to calculate corresponding pay-
ments by the price matrix, then the auctioneer would send the payment and the charge 
to both buyers and sellers. 
Algorithm 2   
Input: X, B, S  //The allocation matrix X, bids of  the tasks B, bids of the devices S 
Output: P, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 
1: Calculate the per unit pricing matrix 
2: for the winner of the buyers 
3:       𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖 =
𝑣𝑖
∑𝑥𝑖𝑗∗∑𝑠𝑗
 
4: end for 
5: for the winner of the sellers 
6:     𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 =
𝑐𝑗
∑𝑠𝑗
 
7: end for 
8: initialize pricing matrix P 
9: for the winner of the buyers 
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10:     for the winner of the sellers 
11:           𝑃𝑖𝑗 = (𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖 + 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗)/2 
12:           if  𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 ≤ 𝑃𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖  
13:           end if 
14:           else 𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗  
15:     end for 
16: end for 
17: calculate the payment and the charge 
18: for the winner of the buyers 
19:      𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑚 ∗
𝑘
𝑚=1 𝑠 𝑗 ∗ 𝑥im 
20: end for 
21: for the winner of the sellers 
22:       𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 = ∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑗 ∗
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑠 𝑗 ∗ 𝑥kj 
23: end for 
24: get  𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 
Fig. 4. The greedy allocation algorithm 
4.3  Algorithm Analysis and Auction Properties 
We now analyze the properties of the allocation and pricing model, including compu-
tational efficiency, individual rationality, budget balance and truthfulness. 
Time complexity analysis.  
Theorem 1: The time complexity of the allocation model is O(mlogm + nlogn +
mn) and the pricing model is O(mn). 
Proof 1: For the allocation model, according to algorithm 1, the complexity for sort-
ing the bid density is O(mlogm +  nlogn), and the generate allocation matrix phase 
is O(mn). Therefore, the complexity of the allocation is O(mlogm + nlogn + mn). 
There are two loops in algorithm 2, thus the complexity of the pricing model is 
O(mn) obiviously. Both of them can be completed in polynomial time. 
Individual Rationality. 
Theorem 2: For each buyer and seller, its utility is not negative. 
Proof 2: According to [Eq.4], the utility of the winner of the buyer is equal to the 
valuation plus the trade price (payment), and the utility of the buyer lose the auction 
equals to zero. In algorithms 1, if the buyer has no extra value to support the cost, it 
will lose the auction. Therefore, the winner have enough value to support the cost, and 
the final payment of buyers is higher than the cost but lower than the valuation, so the 
utility of each buyer is not negative. 
According to [Eq.5], for the winner of the seller, because of the per unit pricing is 
more expensive than the cost, the per unit utility of each seller is not negative, then 
the utility is also not negative. And the utility of the seller lose the auction equals to 
zero. Therefore, the utility of each seller is not negative.  
Budget Balance.  
Theorem 3: The auctioneer in the auction is budget balanced. 
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Proof 3: When the auctioneer gets all the bids, it will determine the winner and pay-
ment of the auction by the allocation model and pricing model, the value of utility of 
the auctioneer equals to the difference between the payments received from all buyers 
and the charges payed to all sellers. Therefore we have  
 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟 = ∑ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖 − ∑𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗  
Because of the per cost of buyers is higher than sellers, so the buyer's sum of pay-
ments is greater than the seller's sum of payments, and the utility of the auctioneer is 
not negative, in other words, the auctioneer in the auction is budget balanced. 
Truthfulness. 
Theorem 4: The greedy allocation and pricing mechanisms are truthful. 
Proof 4: While the allocation matrix X is fixed, both the winner of buyer and the 
seller in the auction get the most efficient allocation. By the pricing strategy, the rev-
enue is fixed and maximized. Buyers (sellers) cannot improve their own utility by 
submitting a fake bid.  
 For the lose buyer failed in the auction. If the buyer submits a lower bid, he will 
still cause his own auction to fail. In this case, the utility is still zero, if a higher bid is 
submitted, it will cause you to obtain resources, but the resulting utility is negative.  
 For the lose seller failed in the auction. If a higher bid is submitted, it still fails and 
the utility is still zero, if the bid is submitted with a lower bid, it will cause him to 
obtain the buyer, but the actual cost is too large and the utility will be negative. 
 In summary, the greedy allocation and pricing mechanisms are truthful. 
5 Simulation Setup and Experimental Results 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our algorithms. 
The presented evaluation metrics are (1): the individual rationality of applications and 
mobile devices; (2): the percentage served users, which is the ratio of the number of 
winning users to the total number of users and the (average) utility of tasks and devic-
es. We will also compare our mechanism with an existing double auction mechanism 
and a maximum matching mechanism to show our improvement. 
By default we assume there are six sensing applications and five devices in a de-
vice-to-device (D2D) cloud,each task can be divided into two different types of sub-
tasks, task1 and task2. We list the task amount and the corresponding bid in Table 1, 
each mobile device has own unused resources, as shown in Table 2. According to the 
evaluation function eq. [10] [11], we compute the bid density for tasks (buyers) and 
devices (sellers). And we assume that α=0.01 and β=0.05. 
Table 1. Bid density of the tasks (buyers) 
Tasks Task1(𝜃1) Task2(𝜃2) v Bid density 
T1 30 30 13 1.732051 
T2 30 20 12 1.563472 
T3 25 25 12 1.545603 
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T4 30 20 11 1.511530 
T5 15 15 10 1.092906 
T6 10 15 9 0.961047 
Table 2. Bid density of the devices (sellers) 
Devices Resource1 Resource2 W v Bid density 
D1 3 6 6 1 0.885689 
D2 5 5 6 1.2 0.958458 
D3 8 6 6 1.5 1.283333 
D4 10 8 5 2 1.670366 
D5 9 9 4 2 1.676305 
 
5.1 Performance on Individual Rationality 
We first investigate the performance of the proposed mechanisms on individual ra-
tionality. 
As shown in Fig.4, we see the submitted bid of the tasks (buyers) are more than the 
final payment and the submitted bid of mobile devices (sellers) are less than the final 
payment, from Fig.5 and Fig.6, we can see both the sellers and the buyers can get 
positive utility. In other words, the algorithms we proposed can achieve the individual 
rationality. 
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Fig. 3. Performance on Individual Rationality 
 
Fig. 4. Utility of Tasks (Buyers) 
 
Fig. 5. Utility of Mobile Devices (Sellers) 
 
5.2 Percentage Served and Total Utility 
We second compare our model with the double auction model in [4], the random allo-
cation scheme, and the maximum matching scheme by the percentage served, total 
utility and average utility. Results for the three metrics are illustrated in Fig. 7(a), Fig. 
7(b) and Fig. 7(c), respectively. 
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Fig. 7. Total Utility and Average Utility 
As shown in Fig. 7(a), we observe the combinatorial double auction (CDA) get a 
better percentage served than the double auction, in the combinatorial double auction 
(CDA) model, we can see six buyers and five sellers win the auction; but in the dou-
ble auction model, only five buyers and five sellers win the auction, one buyer lost the 
auction. We run two thousand times random allocation model, it can be seen the ran-
dom scheme get an average of 3.686 tasks and 3.074 devices get the task offloading. 
And the maximum matching schemes also can not get full use of tasks and devices. 
Then we consider about the utility of the auction. Fig. 7(c) has the same proportional 
relation and tendency with Fig. 7(b), which means the total utility and the average 
utility is a proportional relationship, and the ratio is the total number of sellers and 
buyers. The combinatorial double auction (CDA) model get a 26.3% and 15.8% bene-
fits than the double auction (DA) model and maximum matching mechanism. In the 
CDA model, a task is divided into multiple subtasks and offloaded to different device 
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to execute, and a device is able to offload multiple tasks synchronously, this acceler-
ates the auction process and improve the efficiency of the devices. 
6 Conclusion and Future work 
In this paper, we discuss sensing task assignment problem in D2D clouds and we 
propose a combinatorial double auction mechanism to assign the sensing tasks to 
different mobile devices for distribute processing or parallel processing, where the 
tasks act as the buyers and the devices as the sellers. Then we analyze the economic 
properties. The simulation results show that the mechanisms can achieve a fairy per-
formance than the traditional task allocation schemes and also achieve economic 
properties mentioned earlier. But we have not consider the dependencies between 
tasks. In future work, we will consider to add the task dependency to parallel tasks 
and the release of mobile device resources. And it is also able to consider the survival 
time of mobile devices in the auction mechanisms. 
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